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Abstract
For purposes such as the development of decision support systems, the probabilities
that model the uncertainties in the domain of application are usually elicited from
domain experts. A number of elicitation methods is available. While constructing a real-
life system, we however found none of these methods to be quite usable: they turned out
to be too time-consuming and diﬃcult for experts. In an earlier paper we described a
verbal–numerical response scale we developed to facilitate elicitation of a large number
of probabilities. In this paper we describe a study that justiﬁes our claim that use of this
verbal–numerical scale generally facilitates the assessment process.
 2002 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Probability elicitation; Decision support systems; Accuracy of assessments;
Response scale
1. Introduction
Expert models for decision support systems generally need to represent un-
certainty, which is most often captured in the form of probabilities. Nowadays
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such systems are often based on a probabilistic network, which is a mathe-
matical model ﬁrmly rooted in probability theory [5]. The probabilistic infor-
mation required for such a network may be available in textbooks or databases,
but is almost always, at least partly, elicited from domain experts.
Diﬀerent elicitation methods are available to ask experts for their proba-
bility judgments (for an overview, see e.g., [6,8]). Among these elicitation
methods, the best-known direct method is the presentation of a horizontal or
vertical numerical scale, with, for example, ﬁve anchors labelled with 0%, 25%,
50%, 75% and 100%. Judges are asked to mark a position on the scale, after
which the indicated probability is determined by measuring the distance be-
tween this mark and 0%. Such a scale is easy to understand and use. Its
drawback is that it is diﬃcult for judges to mark ﬁne distinctions; this is es-
pecially important at the endpoints, e.g. between probabilities of 0.01 and
0.001. Two indirect methods that are often used are gambles and probability
wheels. Indirect methods infer a probability assessment from judges choice
behaviour in a controlled situation. With the gamble method, a judge is pre-
sented with a choice between two lotteries. In one of the lotteries the proba-
bility of winning is the probability of the event that is to be assessed, in the
other lottery the probability of winning is set by the elicitor. The elicitor varies
the latter probability until the judge is indiﬀerent about the two lotteries; then
the to-be-assessed probability may be determined. With the probability wheel
method, the judge is asked to compare the probability that a pointer lands on,
e.g., the red section of the wheel, with the probability of the event under
consideration. The to-be-assessed probability is the proportion of the red
section of the wheel when the judge is indiﬀerent about the two chances. The
assumption underlying these indirect methods is that they yield unbiased as-
sessments, but major drawbacks show up in their application. The choices
presented are often diﬃcult to conceptualise, and the methods are diﬃcult to
learn, especially the lotteries, and very time-consuming in use.
We tried out the described methods in constructing a real-life probabilistic
network for therapy selection in the domain of oesophageal cancer, for which
we required the assessment of 4000 point probabilities [11]. We found that for
such a large number of assessments, these standard methods were unsuitable. A
numerical scale gave our experts too little to go by. The gambles proved to be
too diﬃcult and time-consuming, and the experts were aversive to, albeit hy-
pothetically, gambling with their patients health.
In order to elicit the required probabilities, we had to try a diﬀerent ap-
proach, and we therefore designed our own elicitation method. Our new
method is based on the use of a probability scale with both verbal and nu-
merical labels. The design of the scale is described in [7] and brieﬂy reviewed in
Section 2. The method worked quite well with our experts and our domain, and
we hope that it will be applicable in general, but of this we cannot be certain
without further study. Section 3 introduces the study we undertook to ratify
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our scale; Section 4 describes the results and analyses. Conclusions are pre-
sented in Section 5.
2. Design and initial use of the verbal–numerical scale
In an earlier paper [7] we describe a series of four studies that resulted in the
design of a scale with both verbal and numerical probability labels, to be used
in a probability elicitation method. We brieﬂy summarise these four studies
here; the interested reader is referred to [7] for details and also for an extensive
and comprehensive review of literature on the subject of the use of verbal
probability expressions.
In the ﬁrst study we asked subjects which verbal probability expressions they
commonly use. This resulted in a list of seven expressions (see [7] for a dis-
cussion about the appropriateness of these seven expressions). In the second
study we asked (other) subjects to rank order these expressions. This revealed a
quite stable ordering. Distances between the expressions were determined in the
third study, where we asked (yet other) subjects to compare the (dis)similarity
of all pairs of expressions. The distances were used to project the seven ex-
pressions onto a numerical probability scale. We established the following
projections: certain 100%, probable 85%, expected 75%, ﬁfty–ﬁfty 50%, un-
certain 25%, improbable 15% and impossible 0%. 2 The pair-wise comparisons
had however artiﬁcially enlarged the distances. For example, probable and
improbable in isolation were often rated as completely dissimilar, while ob-
viously they are not the end-points of the whole probability scale. In the ﬁnal
version of our scale we corrected for this trend.
We note that these studies were unlike the experiments most other re-
searchers have done: we did not compose our own list of expressions or use
other researchers lists, because we did not want to force a possibly unnatural
vocabulary upon our subjects. In addition, we never asked subjects to directly
translate words into numbers or vice versa, because although words and
numbers are both overt expressions of an internal construct of uncertainty,
solicitation of a numerical expression can have importantly diﬀerent conse-
quences than solicitation of a verbal expression [15].
In the fourth study we tested the above projections of the expressions onto
the scale, by examining whether subjects decisions were inﬂuenced by the
mode, verbal or numerical, in which probability information was presented.
Subjects were for example asked whether they would or would not prescribe
drug X for a patient with a certain disease, when the probability that the
2 In Dutch: zeker, waarschijnlijk, te verwachten, ﬁfty–ﬁfty, onzeker, onwaarschijnlijk, on-
mogelijk.
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patient is allergic to that drug is . . ., with either a verbal or a numerical ex-
pression from the above described set of seven on the dots. Our analyses
showed that the decision subjects made depended on the probability used in the
description of the decision situations and on its context, but that the decisions
were not inﬂuenced by the mode in which the probability was presented. We
thus found diﬀerences between the decision contexts, but not per context be-
tween the verbal and the numerical mode, indicating that context-eﬀects in-
ﬂuence both the interpretation of the verbal and of the numerical expressions
[14].
We concluded that a double scale, with both numerical and verbal labels,
could possibly be helpful in situations where judges prefer to communicate
probabilities in verbal rather than numerical form but where the elicitor wants
numbers as output. Based on the results of these studies we constructed the
scale shown in Exhibit 1 to be used with our new elicitation method. It is a
continuous scale, to allow subjects to indicate any degree of probability. Since,
as argued above, the third study had artiﬁcially enlarged diﬀerences between
verbal expressions, we decided to position the verbal labels closer to the centre
of the scale and not right beside the numerical labels. This had the additional
beneﬁt that the verbal probability labels would not, incorrectly, be taken to be
Exhibit 1
The response scale with both verbal and numerical labels
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exact translations of precise numbers but as a set of labels with a stable rank-
ordering, covering the whole probability continuum.
The verbal–numerical probability scale from Exhibit 1 was used in a
probability elicitation method for the assessment of the 4000 probabilities re-
quired for the construction of a real-life probabilistic network in the domain of
oesophageal cancer (for details on the network and its construction we refer to
[11]). The events in this domain are precise, and therefore assessment of point
probabilities is possible in principle (cf. [13]). Probabilities were elicited from
two domain experts. For each probability that had to be assessed, the experts
were shown the double scale, together with a transcription of that probability
as a fragment of text. By providing a scale for each probability we avoided a
spacing eﬀect, that is: peoples tendency to evenly or aesthetically distribute
diﬀerent assessments on one scale [12]. Transcriptions and scales pertaining to
the probabilities of a single distribution, that is, those that should sum to 100%,
were grouped on a single page or on two consecutive pages. By asking the
experts to assess a complete distribution at a time we avoided a centering eﬀect
of the separate probabilities [12]. We told our experts that, initially, it suﬃced
to give only rough assessments of these probabilities. Sensitivity analysis
methods could subsequently identify those probabilities that highly inﬂuenced
the output of the network [3], and these probabilities could, if necessary, be
reﬁned at a later stage.
With this elicitation method, our experts were able to give their assessments
at a rate of 150–175 per hour [10]. To our satisfaction, we were thus able to
elicit the 4000 probabilities in reasonable time and without asking too much
eﬀort from our experts. Evaluation of the networks diagnostic accuracy
against patient data showed that, based on the initial rough assessments, for
85% of the patients the network gave the correct diagnosis. For only 20% of the
assessments the experts had marked the anchors on the scale, that is, for 80% of
the assessments they had exploited the ﬂexibility provided by the continuous
scale.
In an interview set up to evaluate our experts use of the described elicitation
method, they indicated that they had found it most eﬀective and quite easy to
use. More speciﬁcally, they said that they had found the presence of both
numerical and verbal labels next to the scale quite helpful. They had used
words as well as numbers when thinking about their assessments, depending on
how familiar they had felt with the situation to be assessed. The more uncertain
they had felt, the more they had been inclined to think in verbal terms. The
experts also said that they felt comfortable with the speciﬁc expressions pre-
sented. They did indicate that the expression impossible is hardly ever used in
oncology, especially when communicating with patients; they preferred to use
improbable to refer to almost impossible events. The fact that the experts
interpretation of the word improbable was lower than the interpretation sug-
gested by our scale did not hamper the scales usability: the experts would
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assess an event as improbable, subsequently indicate that a probability of
around 15% was too high, and place a mark lower on the scale. We observed
that they almost never used extreme probabilities in their assessments and
wondered whether this was an artefact of the scale. However, when we put this
observation to our experts, they said they had never felt the need to indicate
such extreme assessments.
These initial experiences with the use of our verbal–numerical scale as part
of a probability elicitation method were very encouraging, but they only in-
volved a single domain and two experts. To assess the general applicability of
the scale, we decided that further study was required.
3. Preliminary considerations
The aim of the study described in this paper is to assess the general usability
of our scale. Research has shown that it hardly makes any diﬀerences in the
assessments which method is used to elicit probability judgements [4] and we
had found that adding verbal labels to a numerical scale facilitated the as-
sessment process for our experts in our domain. Would this be so for other
judges and in other domains as well?
In a review of human probability processing, based on an abundance of
literature on the subject, Budescu and Wallsten [1,13] address issues to consider
in the communication of uncertainty. They observe that one of the solutions to
potential communication problems caused by the use of verbal expressions of
uncertainty is to standardise the language by using a verbal scale with a small
subset of rank-ordered, frequently used terms and associating a range of
probabilities with each term. Such a standardised scale would, they continue,
be feasible if people can suspend or suppress the meanings they normally as-
sociate with these terms, and if the interpretation of the terms is independent of
context.
The solution proposed by Budescu and Wallsten not only standardises the
verbal expressions used, but also the interpretation of these expressions in
terms of a ﬁxed range of probabilities. They therefore actually do not propose
using a scale but rather a list of non-overlapping categories. The verbal–
numerical scale we developed does oﬀer a small subset of rank-ordered, fre-
quently used terms. It is, moreover, an actual (continuous) scale that only
suggests an interpretation for each verbal expression, but does not enforce the
interpretation to be within a predeﬁned range. It is therefore no problem if the
interpretation of an expression depends on context, and people do not have to
suspend or suppress the meaning they associate with the terms. In addition we
claim that our scale, with both words and numbers, minimises the between-
subject variability found in the interpretation of both verbal and numerical
probabilities (see e.g., [2,9]).
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We found that a verbal–numerical probability response scale allowed our
experts to assess reliable probabilities eﬃciently and comfortably. Informal
support for our scale also came from students in a course on medical decision
making, who compared the elicitation of probabilities with our scale and with
lotteries. They found that the lotteries were complicated, cumbersome and
diﬃcult to understand, while the double scale was judged quite easy to use and
enabled faster assessments than the time-consuming lotteries. Artiﬁcial Intel-
ligence students also tested our scale, this time on expert chess players. They
compared our scale to three other versions: with numbers only, words only and
with no labels. They found no diﬀerences between the experts assessments of
their chance of winning given a certain chess position, no diﬀerences in the
conﬁdence in their assessments, nor in the time it had taken them or in reported
ease of use.
These initial experiences were quite promising, but obviously provided in-
suﬃcient guarantee that the scale would indeed facilitate the process of
probability assessment in other domains and for other judges. To justify the
more general promotion of our scale, we needed to answer some further
questions: Do people in general ﬁnd the scale comfortable? Is it a good al-
ternative to a numerical scale, the most widely used response scale? Does it
elicit accurate assessments? We addressed these questions in the study reported
in this paper.
4. Ratifying our scale
This section describes the study we set up to put our verbal–numerical
probability assessment scale to test. Subjects were given a set of questions
describing well-deﬁned probability events, such as at least two people in a
group of 20 having their birthday on the same day. Although the task was
intended to be an estimation task rather than a calculation task, we used this
type of question to be able to determine the accuracy of subjects assessments
by comparing them to the correct answers. See Appendix A for the list of
questions used.
We checked the accuracy of the probability judgements elicited with two
diﬀerent scales. The ﬁrst scale was our double scale and the second scale had
numerical labels only, which were the same as the numerical labels on our
double scale. We predicted that the judgments given on the double scale would
be as correct as the judgements on the single scale. We included two groups of
subjects, arts students and mathematics students, which allowed us to control
for a possible bias towards verbal or numerical expressions by language versus
number oriented subjects. By making the questions quite diﬃcult, and by
setting a time limit, we practically excluded the possibility of calculation. We
also compared the subjects certainty, which they stated with each assessment
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in answer to the question how certain they were that that assessment was
correct. We expected subjects who used the double scale to be more certain
about their assessments, because they had been allowed to choose their pre-
ferred mode of expression. We also looked at how comfortable subjects felt
using the two scales. We expected that the double scale would be at least as
easy, and generally easier, to use than the numerical scale, because it gave
subjects more support. This was determined by comparing answers to pertinent
questions (see below).
4.1. Subjects
There were 29 arts students, 10 male and 19 female, who ﬁlled in the
questionnaire with the double scale (group A1) and 29 arts students, 9 male
and 20 female, who used the scale with only numerical labels (group A2). There
were 22 mathematics students, 18 male and 4 female, who used the double scale
(group B1) and 27 mathematics students, 23 male and 4 female, who used the
numerical scale (group B2). The mean age of all 107 subjects together was 22
years, ranging from 17 to 43.
4.2. Procedure
We used the eight probability questions from Appendix A. Next to each
question the vertical response scale was depicted; for half the subjects (groups
A1 and B1) this response scale was our double scale with words to the left and
numbers to the right of the anchors, for the other half (groups A2 and B2) the
scale had only numbers positioned to the right. Underneath each problem was
the question: How certain are you that your answer is correct? to be answered
on a ﬁve-point scale labelled certain and uncertain at the extremes. To
control for order-eﬀects, we had two versions of the list of questions, one with
the questions in the order as given in Appendix A, and one with the questions
in reverse order.
On the cover page, subjects were instructed to use their numerical intuition
to estimate the answers, not to think too long about their answers and certainly
not to calculate, and to ﬁnish all questions within 5 min. Subjects were also
asked for their name (optional), age, gender and discipline. On the last page,
we included four questions to get our subjects opinion about the scale: How
diﬃcult did you ﬁnd the questions? (with answers on a ﬁve-point scale from
very diﬃcult¼ 1 to very easy¼ 5); Did you calculate at all? (with answers
from not at all¼ 1 to all the time¼ 5); To what extent was the scale a support
in giving your estimations? (not at all¼ 1 to perfectly¼ 5) and To what ex-
tent did the scale enable you to express your assessment correctly? (not at
all¼ 1 to perfectly¼ 5).
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4.3. Data analysis
We scored the probability and certainty assessments of all questions sepa-
rately. When, for their probability assessments, subjects had marked the scale
itself, we rounded oﬀ our measurement of their assessment to the nearest
multiple of 5, thereby taking into account that the scale only allows for rough
assessments. When subjects had circled a word, we took the closest multiple of
5 of the corresponding (virtual) number on the scale (e.g., uncertain¼ 30). For
each subject and each question we computed the diﬀerence between her/his
answer and the correct answer rounded oﬀ to a whole percent. We then per-
formed a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) to establish whether
background (arts versus mathematics) and type of scale inﬂuenced the as-
sessments for the eight questions.
For each subject we computed the mean certainty about her/his assessment,
which ranged from 1¼ uncertain to 5¼ certain. For the four evaluation
questions we also established the mean values. With MANOVA we tested the
inﬂuence of background and type of scale on the diﬀerent scores.
4.4. Results
We found no eﬀects of the diﬀerent order of the questions on the assess-
ments or any of the scores, so we report our results over the four groups
without making a distinction between subjects who answered the questions in
the diﬀerent orders.
4.4.1. Probability assessments
The correct answers and the mean assessments of the four groups are pre-
sented in Exhibit 2. The mean errors, that is: diﬀerences between the proba-
bility assessments and the correct answers, were )2.9 (SD ¼ 8:16) for group A1,
)6.8 (SD ¼ 9:34) for group A2, )4.1 (SD ¼ 9:52) for group B1 and )6.8
Exhibit 2
Correct probabilities and mean answers (plus SD) for each of the eight questions and for each
group
Question Correct answer Group A1 Group A2 Group B1 Group B2
1 33 45 (21) 47 (23) 46 (17) 41 (18)
2 14 21 (23) 17 (18) 28 (18) 24 (22)
3 92 73 (16) 69 (18) 74 (19) 71 (17)
4 39 48 (15) 44 (18) 50 (16) 48 (18)
5 80 82 (12) 73 (15) 71 (16) 70 (17)
6 4 21 (18) 19 (17) 8 (7) 9 (12)
7 92 61 (20) 54 (22) 61 (27) 54 (26)
8 41 18 (19) 16 (16) 26 (21) 25 (26)
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(SD ¼ 6:82) for group B2. These negative mean errors indicate that subjects on
average assessed lower probabilities than was correct. From Exhibit 2 we see
that subjects strongly underestimated high probabilities and slightly overesti-
mated low probabilities.
The MANOVA showed that over all questions there was a signiﬁcant main
eﬀect of background (F ð8; 93Þ ¼ 4:160, p ¼ 0:000), but not of the type of scale
(F ð8; 93Þ ¼ 0:678). An interaction eﬀect of background and scale was also
absent (F ð8; 93Þ ¼ 0:222). Univariate analyses showed that the overall main
eﬀect of background was caused by signiﬁcant diﬀerences on questions 5
(F ð1; 100Þ ¼ 6:800, p ¼ 0:011), 6 (F ð1; 100Þ ¼ 19:417, p ¼ 0:000) and 8
(F ð1; 100Þ ¼ 4:969, p ¼ 0:028).
4.4.2. Certainty
The mean certainty about the assessments was 3.45 (SD ¼ 0:54) for group
A1, 2.92 (SD ¼ 0:67) for group A2, 3.69 (SD ¼ 0:61) for group B1 and 3.33
(SD ¼ 0:81) for group B2. The MANOVA showed that over all questions there
was a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of background (F ð8; 91Þ ¼ 3:500, p ¼ 0:001), with
the mathematics students being signiﬁcantly more certain, and of scale
(F ð8; 91Þ ¼ 2:098, p ¼ 0:044), with the groups using the double scale being
signiﬁcantly more certain. We found no interaction eﬀect of background and
scale (F ð8; 91Þ ¼ 0:846). The certainties diﬀered only slightly per question, and
were not related to the correctness of the probability assessments.
4.4.3. Evaluation of the scale
In Exhibit 3 we present the means of the scores, per group, on the four
evaluation questions. The MANOVA revealed signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
the four groups on the ﬁrst question, about the ease of the problems
(F ð3; 102Þ ¼ 7:232, p ¼ 0:000), and on the third question, whether the scale had
helped assessment (F ð3; 102Þ ¼ 6:890, p ¼ 0:000).
We found that both groups A1 and B1, who had been presented with the
double scale, together found the problems much easier (F ð1; 104Þ ¼ 7:125,
p ¼ 0:009) and had appreciated the support given by the scale more
(F ð1; 104Þ ¼ 5:055, p ¼ 0:027). Looking at the arts groups together (A1 and
Exhibit 3
Means (and SD) of answers to evaluation questions for all groups, on a 1–5 scale with 1¼ not at
all and 5¼ very much
Group Easy? Calculated? Support? Enables expression?
A1 2.5 (0.2) 2.2 (0.2) 2.7 (0.2) 2.9 (0.2)
A2 1.8 (0.2) 2.1 (0.2) 2.2 (0.2) 2.9 (0.2)
B1 2.8 (0.2) 2.5 (0.2) 1.8 (0.2) 2.7 (0.3)
B2 2.6 (0.2) 2.8 (0.2) 1.4 (0.2) 2.6 (0.2)
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A2) versus the mathematics groups (B1 and B2) we saw that the arts students
had found the questions signiﬁcantly more diﬃcult (F ð1; 104Þ ¼ 10:529,
p ¼ 0:002) and had found the scale signiﬁcantly more of a support
(F ð1; 104Þ ¼ 15:131, p ¼ 0:000), and also that they had calculated signiﬁcantly
less (F ð1; 104Þ ¼ 6:906, p ¼ 0:010). The question whether the scale allowed
correct assessments was not answered signiﬁcantly diﬀerently by the four
groups of subjects.
4.5. Conclusion
We had expected that probability assessments on the double scale would be
as correct as assessments on the scale with only numerical expressions. Our
results conﬁrmed this hypothesis; the probability assessments were not inﬂu-
enced by the type of scale subjects had been presented with to indicate their
assessments. In Exhibit 2 we do observe a centering eﬀect. This eﬀect is caused
by the fact that in this study we only asked for single probabilities and not, as
with our two experts, for complete distributions.
Subjects who had been presented with the double scale were, as expected,
more certain of their assessments. These subjects had found the problems easier
to answer than the subjects who had only been given numbers, and they had
appreciated the scale as signiﬁcantly more supportive. The arts students dif-
fered from the mathematics students; they had, as was to be expected, found
the questions more diﬃcult. Some said that they would not be able to give
correct answers because they had not been trained in mathematics. Under-
standably then, they had been less certain, had made fewer calculations and
they had appreciated the support given by the scale more than the mathematics
students.
Taken together, this study supports our hypothesis that the double scale
does not hamper probability assessment, on the contrary: it leads to accurate
assessments and it facilitates the process for the numerically less literate.
4.6. Supplement
We performed a small additional experiment to test whether the assessments
we elicited with the double scale were stable, that is, remained constant over
time. We presented 21 Information Science students with the questionnaire
that had been used before, but this time only the version with the verbal–
numerical response scale was used. The same group of students answered the
same questions twice with a two-week interval. At the end of the ﬁrst session
they were told that we would come back ‘‘with a similar questionnaire’’ in two
weeks; in fact, it was the exact same questionnaire. It was unlikely that the
subjects would remember their answers after such an interval, and they were
not given feedback about the correctness of their answers.
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Spearmans correlations between the assessments for the two sessions were
computed for each subject individually and ranged between 0.361 and 0.994.
They were signiﬁcant, two-tailed, for 14 of our 21 subjects (at p ¼ 0:01 for 5
and at p ¼ 0:05 for 9 subjects). The correlation over all subjects was signiﬁcant:
0.752, p ¼ 0:00. The probability assessments of subjects thus remained con-
stant over time when the verbal–numerical response scale was used.
5. General discussion
Our study conﬁrmed our initial experiences and showed that presenting
subjects with a response scale that includes both verbal and numerical labels
for their probability assessments facilitates the assessment process. The accu-
racy of the assessments with the double scale is comparable to that of assess-
ments with a numerical scale and people ﬁnd the double scale more comfortable
to use. Results indicate that assessments with the double scale remain stable
over time, implying that the verbal labels do not cause random variation in the
assessments. In assessing a probability for the same event twice, people ap-
parently use the same label as anchor. We thus think that this scale is of great
help to elicitors and experts who are co-operating in specifying probabilities,
especially if large numbers of probabilities are to be assessed and inaccuracy is
not a big issue. Although our verbal–numerical scale makes it diﬃcult to ex-
press ﬁne-grained probabilities, for most purposes a coarser assessment suﬃces,
and diﬀerences between a probability of for example 0.15 and 0.17 are irrele-
vant.
Stating probabilistic information may be a daunting task for experts when
the questions are presented in a format that makes great demands on their
cognitive processes. When their response mode preferences are taken into ac-
count, as we did by presenting them with the opportunity to choose whether to
state their probabilities verbally or numerically, the task becomes feasible, and
the possibility of building real-life decision support systems based on proba-
bilistic networks becomes more realistic. We therefore feel justiﬁed in advo-
cating the more widespread use of our verbal–numerical scale.
We would like to note that we might have found more pronounced diﬀer-
ences between a numbers only and a double scale had we used diﬀerent
questions, in which no numbers ﬁgured. We could for example have asked:
Recognising that it is nowadays to be expected that trains are delayed, what is
your chance of arriving in time at your meeting in another city if you take the
regular 8.15 a.m. train? We had to decide not to use such questions, because
we would have been unable to establish the correct answer to compare our
subjects assessments to. However, now that we have seen that the assessments
are equally correct with both types of scale, we may set up a follow-up study in
which such questions are used.
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Finally, we do not pretend to have developed the verbal–numerical response
scale. Indeed, diﬀerent groups of subjects, from diﬀerent professional domains,
may prefer other words than the ones we have used. If so, the words that are
used in a speciﬁc domain can replace the words we selected for the scale. The
actual numerical interpretation of the words, which may vary per context, is of
less importance than familiarity with terms, as the continuous scale allows the
assessor to correct for eﬀects of variable interpretation. Further research is
foreseen to investigate this claim.
We conclude that we have shown that a continuous response scale that
combines verbal and numerical labels close by or next to the anchors is not
only possible, but is indeed very helpful to assessors who face the task of as-
sessing a large number of probabilities.
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Appendix A. Probability questions
1. Consider a vase with ﬁfty balls, thirty of which are colored red and the re-
maining twenty green. You randomly draw ﬁve balls, without replace-
ment. What is your estimation of the chance of drawing more than three
red balls?
2. In a group of three hundred students, 136 study French and 122 study Span-
ish; 65 students study both French and Spanish. A student is randomly se-
lected from this group. What is your estimation of the chance that this
student studies neither Spanish nor French?
3. In a court of law, a suspect is convicted when found guilty by the judge. If a
suspect is guilty, then the judge will indeed convict the suspect in 95% of the
cases; if the suspect is innocent, the judge will ﬁnd him indeed innocent in
80% of the cases. Suppose that 70% of all suspects in a court of law are
guilty. What is your estimation of the chance that a convicted suspect is in-
deed guilty?
4. Consider a bag with twelve coins. Five of the coins are fair, four coins have
been manipulated such that the chance of tossing heads is only 30%, and 3
coins are two-headed. You randomly draw a coin from the bag and toss it
twice. What is your estimation of the chance that both tosses result in heads?
5. Three students Wout, Piet and Bas are the only participants in a swimming
contest. Wout and Piet have equal chances of winning and both are twice as
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likely to win as Bas. What is your estimation of the chance that Wout or Piet
wins?
6. A factory has three production belts on which micro-chips are produced. Of
the chips produced on belt A, 4% is defective; for belt B this percentage is 5%
and for belt C 1%. Half of all chips manufactured by the factory are pro-
duced on belt A, 30% on belt B and 20% on belt C. A random chip is selected
from the factorys production. What is your estimation of the chance that
this chip is defective?
7. Due to delays, the train from Groningen will arrive sometime between 8:00
and 8:30 (on a whole minute) in Utrecht; the train from Maastricht will ar-
rive sometime between 8:15 and 9:00 (on a whole minute). What is your es-
timation of the chance that the train from Groningen will arrive before the
train from Maastricht?
8. What is your estimation of the chance that in a class of twenty students, two
of them have their birthdays on the same day?
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